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There has been considerable recent interest in the consequences of closed timelike curves (CTCs)
for the dynamics of quantum mechanical systems. A vast majority of research into this area makes
use of the dynamical equations developed by Deutsch, which were developed from a consistency
condition that assumes that mixed quantum states uniquely describe the physical state of a system.
We criticize this choice of consistency condition from an epistemic perspective, i.e., a perspective
in which the quantum state represents a state of knowledge about a system. We demonstrate that
directly applying Deutsch’s condition when mixed states are treated as representing an observer’s
knowledge of a system can conceal time travel paradoxes from the observer, rather than resolving
them. To shed further light on the appropriate dynamics for quantum systems traversing CTCs,
we make use of a toy epistemic theory with a strictly classical ontology due to Spekkens and show
that, in contrast to the results of Deutsch, many of the traditional paradoxical effects of time travel
are present.
I. INTRODUCTION
While chronology violations (i.e., objects traveling
backwards in time) have never been observed, they can
occur in solutions of classical general relativity in the
form of closed timelike curves (CTCs) [1–5]. Without a
quantum theory of gravity (and potentially, more empir-
ical data on the initial conditions of the universe), the
possibility of CTCs is unknown. Nevertheless, thought
experiments that determine the potential implications
of CTCs for quantum mechanics and general relativity
could provide insight into a range of foundational ques-
tions. Specifically, as emphasized by Deutsch [6], CTCs
are an extreme phenomenon that require additional as-
sumptions in addition to standard non-relativistic quan-
tum mechanics. Different interpretations of quantum
mechanics naturally lead to different additional assump-
tions, which in turn may lead to physically distinguish-
able predictions within the modified theory. We can
therefore use thought-experiments based on quantum
particles traversing CTCs to compare different interpre-
tations of the theory.
A fundamental issue that interpretations of quantum
mechanics seek to address is the relationship between
the mathematical formalism of quantum mechanics and
physical reality (if a physical reality is assumed to exist).
One such relationship involves deciding whether quan-
tum states are ontic or epistemic states. The ontic state
of a system is the physical (i.e. objective) state that the
system is in, whereas an epistemic state assigned to a
system by an observer is an object that reflects the ob-
server’s knowledge about the system. An epistemic state
is typically a probability distribution over the space of
ontic states. From these definitions, one can see that the
ontic state of a system is unique, while epistemic states
in general are not (i.e., different observers can describe a
system by different epistemic states).
The issue of ontic and epistemic states is particularly
important when considering CTCs because, as we will
argue, the interpretation of quantum states as either on-
tic or epistemic will naturally lead to different assump-
tions about how quantum systems behave in the pres-
ence of CTCs. For example, Deutsch [6] studied various
time travel scenarios in a classical model and then in
a quantum model motivated by an ontic interpretation
of quantum states (specifically, the Everett interpreta-
tion [7]). While in the classical model, paradoxes could
occur, Deutsch argued that no paradoxes occur in his
quantum treatment. Although all paradoxes are resolved,
the resulting theory is not standard quantum theory, but
a new nonlinear theory. Some of the implications of the
deviation from quantum mechanics include: that quan-
tum computers with access to CTCs can efficiently solve
NP -complete problems [8]; that classical and quantum
computers with access to CTCs have the same computa-
tional power [9]; that observers can perfectly distinguish
nonorthogonal states (rendering quantum cryptography
vulnerable to an adversary with access to CTCs) [10];
the evolution of chronology-respecting particles can be a
discontinuous function of the initial state [11] and that
information can be stored without degradation [12]. (For
alternate perspectives on these results, see [13–16].)
All of these results stem from the assumptions that
Deutsch advocated, based on his interpretation. These
assumptions, motivated by an ontic interpretation of
quantum states, are particularly unconventional, in part
because they require that mixed quantum states are on-
tic. (Although it is common for pure quantum states to
be interpreted as ontic, most interpretations view mixed
states as epistemic, i.e., reflecting an observers lack of
knowledge.)
In this paper, we demonstrate that using different in-
terpretations of the quantum state naturally leads to dif-
ferent assumptions for quantum systems traversing CTCs
than Deutsch’s. Specifically, we argue that the behavior
of epistemic states describing quantum systems travers-
ing CTCs allows for paradoxes, just as in the classical
case, and that often the theory will conceal paradoxes
2rather than resolving them. We also examine how a toy
epistemic theory with a classical ontology behaves in the
presence of CTCs in order to gain some insight into what
the existence of CTCs would imply for an epistemic in-
terpretation of quantum mechanics.
The paper is structured as follows. In Sec. II we discuss
the concept of time travel paradoxes and fix our terminol-
ogy. In Sec. III we discuss a specific way of resolving time
travel paradoxes due to Deutsch [6], highlighting that this
method interprets mixed quantum states as ontic states.
We then demonstrate that applying consistency condi-
tions to epistemic states as if they were ontic states has
the tendency to conceal paradoxes, rather than resolve
them. In Sec. IV, we outline some considerations that
an epistemic interpretation of quantum mechanics must
address and then examine the effect of CTCs on a toy
epistemic model.
II. PARADOXES WITH CLOSED TIMELIKE
CURVES
One of the challenges when discussing time travel is
nomenclature, so we begin by introducing some termi-
nology. A chronology-respecting trajectory is a time-
like worldline that never intersects itself. A chronology-
violating trajectory is a timelike worldline that intersects
itself. A chronology-respecting (-violating) object is an
object that is on a chronology-respecting (-violating) tra-
jectory. According to a chronology-respecting observer,
chronology-violating and chronology-respecting trajecto-
ries come together in some region in space-time where
the systems on those trajectories can interact. Then the
trajectories diverge and there are no more interactions
between those systems. We consider networks for which
there is only one chronology-violating worldline, namely,
a CTC.
Chronology violations make the chronological ordering
of two time-like separated events, A and B, subjective.
This makes the notions of ‘past’ and ‘future’ ambiguous.
(More precisely, within a special relativistic setting, it
confuses the notions of past and future light cones.) To
avoid this technical difficulty, all references to time are
with respect to a chronology-respecting observer.
To examine the possible consequences of CTCs, we
use the phenomenological circuit model introduced by
Deutsch and illustrated in Fig. 1. In diagrams of this
type, time flows from left to right according to some
chronology-respecting observer. The existence of a CTC
is introduced by identifying two points in the diagram
(denoted by double vertical lines) to form a closed loop,
while the mechanism that generates the CTC is ignored.
Each horizontal line in the diagram represents the world-
line of a single particle, where worldlines terminating in
double vertical lines represent chronology-violating parti-
cles, while worldlines extending to past- and future- infin-
ity represent chronology-respecting particles. All inter-
actions between chronology-respecting and chronology-
FIG. 1. A chronology-violating network with an interaction
between a chronology-respecting system and a chronology-
violating system. In diagrams of this form, time flows from
left to right. The double vertical lines are identified as a single
spacetime point, forming a CTC.
violating particles, as well as the free evolution of all
particles, are localized into a single equivalent interac-
tion, represented by a box, acting on the ontic states of
the particles.
From the perspective of classical physics, time travel
can lead to paradoxes. We distinguish two classes of para-
doxes: consistency paradoxes and information paradoxes.
Due to the difficulty of defining ‘information’ without ref-
erence to specific ontic and epistemic states, we will not
discuss information paradoxes1. We define a consistency
paradox as a scenario for which there exist initial states of
the chronology-respecting system with no consistent so-
lution for the state of the chronology-violating systems.
An example of a consistency paradox is the autoinfan-
ticide paradox, in which an agent travels back in time
and kills a younger version of themself before that ver-
sion can travel back in time. This paradox implies that
any agent who will choose to kill a younger version of
themself and who possesses the ability to kill a younger
version of themself cannot travel back in time. That is,
the initial conditions are restricted because otherwise the
causal loop would be inconsistent.
III. DEUTSCH’S CONSISTENCY CONDITION
Deutsch considered paradoxical situations, like the
consistency paradox of the previous section, using quan-
tum systems instead of classical ones [6]. We now review
his construction.
Consider the circuit depicted in Fig. 2, in which a
chronology-violating system interacts with a chronology-
respecting system. Because the chronology-respecting
system has not interacted with any systems travers-
ing the CTC in its unambiguous past (as defined by
1 An example of an information paradox is a scenario in which a
physicist is given the plans to build a time machine and then
uses those plans to go back in time and give himself the plans.
In this case, the information required to build a time machine
has spontaneously come into existence on a CTC.
3FIG. 2. A chronology-violating network with an interaction
U between a chronology-respecting system and a chronology-
violating system. The chronology-respecting (-violating) sys-
tem is in the ontic state ρinCR (ρ
in
CTC) before the interaction
and ρoutCR (ρ
out
CTC) afterwards.
its own worldline), then the chronology-respecting and
chronology-violating systems are unentangled immedi-
ately prior to the interaction (since they have had no
common past in which to become entangled), i.e.,
ρinCR ⊗ ρ
in
CTC . (1)
(Note that while the chronology-respecting and
chronology-violating systems are assumed to be
unentangled, the chronology-respecting system may
be entangled with some other systems, so ρˆin
CR
may
represent a reduced density matrix of a larger system.)
Therefore, after the two systems interact, the joint state
of the system is
U
(
ρinCR ⊗ ρ
in
CTC
)
U † , (2)
where U is an arbitrary unitary matrix representing the
interaction between the two systems. In general, Eq. (2)
cannot be represented as a product state, i.e.
U
(
ρinCR ⊗ ρ
in
CTC
)
U † 6= ρ1 ⊗ ρ2 , (3)
for any two density matrices ρ1 and ρ2.
After the interaction, the two systems are separated,
with the chronology-respecting system following its time-
line into the unambiguous future, and the chronology-
violating system traveling back in time. If the two sys-
tems remain entangled, then from the ontic interpreta-
tion of the quantum state advocated by Deutsch, the
chronology-violating system can be affected by perform-
ing measurements on the chronology-respecting system.
This would then update the state of the chronology-
respecting system, which changes the way that the
chronology-violating system is changed, and so on ad in-
finitum. At this point, at least two possible solutions
to this problem exist. The first is to use the notion of
time-displaced entanglement [17], treating entanglement
between particles at different times as physically mean-
ingful.
The alternative approach advocated by Deutsch corre-
sponds to assuming that the means by which the systems
are separated and the second system continues along
the CTC (e.g., by one entering the mouth of a worm-
hole) causes an instantaneous change on both systems
such that the output state takes the unentangled form
ρout
CR
⊗ ρout
CTC
, where
ρoutCR = TrCTC[U
(
ρinCR ⊗ ρ
in
CTC
)
U †] , (4)
ρoutCTC = TrCR[U
(
ρinCR ⊗ ρ
in
CTC
)
U †] . (5)
Although the partial trace is commonly used to describe
subsystems, it usually does not signify a change in the
joint state of the combined system. Here, the partial
trace represents a nonlocal physical mechanism that en-
sures that any entanglement between the chronology-
respecting and violating qubits is removed. Without
analysing such a mechanism in detail, we note the sim-
ilarities to some quantum descriptions of the process of
black hole evaporation.
Finally, Deutsch identifies the state of the chronology-
violating systems after the interaction with the state of
these systems before, requiring that
ρinCTC = ρ
out
CTC . (6)
Deutsch denotes this as the kinematical consistency con-
dition. It arises because, with this interpretation, ρCTC
is the element of reality that travels back in time. The
CTC is identifying the physical state of affairs at two
points, “out” and “in”, and thus if ρCTC is an ontic state
then it is a sensible requirement to enforce the kinemat-
ical consistency condition (6).
With this condition, Deutsch showed that there are
never any time travel paradoxes, because Eq. (5) subject
to the constraint of Eq. (6) always possesses a solution.
(In general, it possesses many solutions, and Deutsch pro-
poses a maximum-entropy condition to select a unique
one that corresponds to the physical state of the system.)
However, it arises from a non-standard interpretation of
the generally mixed state ρCTC as an ontic state, whereas
mixed states are typically interpreted as epistemic states.
To see that the partial trace condition (6) corresponds
to a nonlocal physical change that removes correlations
between chronology-respecting and chronology-violating
systems, consider the situation depicted in Fig. 3 (a) for
quantum particles using Deutsch’s consistency condition.
Systems A and B are qubits prepared in some maximally
entangled state ηˆAB (where the subscripts denote the sys-
tems that are entangled) and the chronology-violating
qubit is in some mixed state ρˆC . The joint state of the
three qubits immediately before the interaction is
α = ηˆAB ⊗ ρˆC . (7)
The swap gate simply swaps the states of qubit B and
the chronology-violating qubit, so the joint state of the
three qubits immediately after the interaction is
α = ηˆAC ⊗ ρˆB . (8)
Because the trace of any maximally entangled state over
any subsystem is the maximally mixed state, the only
consistent state of the chronology-violating qubit is
ρC =
1
2
I2 , (9)
i.e., the maximally mixed state. (Here, I2 is the 2×2 iden-
tity matrix.) From Eq. 4, the corresponding output of the
chronology-respecting qubits is also the maximally mixed
4FIG. 3. a) One half of a chronology-respecting Bell pair in-
teracting with a qubit on a CTC. b) One half of a Bell pair
entering a time machine at a time t to travel back to a time
t− δt (according to some chronology-respecting observer).
state. So not only is there no entanglement between
chronology-respecting and chronology-violating qubits,
but also all correlations between the two chronology-
respecting qubits have been removed by this interaction
under Deutsch’s consistency condition and all informa-
tion has been lost.
There are two equivalent ways of considering the inter-
action implemented by a swap gate. The first, depicted
in Fig. 3 (a), corresponds to the internal states of two dis-
tinct particles being swapped, while the second, shown in
Fig. 3 (b), corresponds to a physical swap of the particles,
in which qubit B enters a time machine at a time t (with
respect to a chronology-respecting observer), emerging
at some earlier time t − δt and continuing on towards
future infinity. In this second picture, no interaction has
actually taken place and, by assumption, no non-unitary
evolution has occurred. In the limit δt → 0, nothing
actually happens physically, and yet all correlations and
information are lost.2
A. Revisiting Deutsch’s consistency condition
Is the kinematical consistency condition a reasonable
consistency condition to apply to quantum states? If a
particle travels back in time, it is natural to equate the
physical properties of the particle at the point “out” with
those at the point “in” (given that we localized all evo-
lution of the time-traveling particle to the interaction).
With this in mind, the kinematical consistency condition
2 An explanation of this phenomenon within the Everett interpre-
tation is that that time travel always leads to particles traveling
between branches of the ‘universal wave-function’ and so parti-
cles within a particular branch are no longer correlated because
they were not prepared in an entangled state together (i.e., they
were prepared in entangled states with copies of each other).
However, this explanation obviously only applies to the Everett
interpretation, as it requires branches of some ‘universal wave-
function’ for particles to travel between.
(6) relies on the mixed state ρCTC being an ontic state,
i.e., an element of reality. This is an unconventional in-
terpretation.
In this section, we argue that consistency conditions
such as Eq. (6) cannot be immediately applied to epis-
temic states, rather, they must be applied to ontic states.
This is a critical point, because it illustrates that unless
mixed states are ontic states, the kinematical consistency
condition is not an appropriate consistency condition and
consequently any predicted behavior that results from
applying it to quantum systems near CTCs can be inter-
preted as resulting from an observer failing to distinguish
their knowledge about reality from reality itself. This
feature was recognized by Deutsch, who stated that the
kinematical consistency condition is (emphasis his) [6]
the correct condition under the unmod-
ified quantum formalism, but it is either
wrong or insufficient under every other ver-
sion of quantum theory, just as under classical
physics.
Note that, to Deutsch, the unmodified quantum formal-
ism is the Everett interpretation.
To demonstrate that consistency conditions must be
applied to ontic states, we present a classical example
where there are no consistent solutions for the ontic state
(i.e., a classical time travel paradox), but an observer
with limited knowledge would not see the paradox if they
apply consistency conditions to their knowledge of the
classical system, rather than to the state of the classical
system itself.
Consider a classical object with 2 states (i.e., a bit)
traveling on a CTC. It is initially (with respect to some
chronology-respecting observer) in either the ontic state
0 or in the ontic state 1. A bit-flip operation, F , is then
applied, so that if it was in the ontic state 0 it is now in
the ontic state 1 and vice versa. But then when the bit
continues on the loop and arrives back at the same point,
it is in the opposite ontic state. This is a consistency
paradox for either of the possible initial ontic states, since
the physical state of a system should be unique (single-
valued) at any point in spacetime.
Now consider the epistemic state that an observer as-
signs to the bit. For a classical bit, the epistemic state
takes the form of a probability distribution over the pos-
sible ontic states. If the observer is uncertain about the
ontic state of the bit and describes the bit immediately
prior to the flip operation by the epistemic state
P in(0) = 0.5 , (10)
P in(1) = 0.5 , (11)
then after the bit flip, the observer would assign the epis-
temic state
P out(0) = P in(F (1)) = 0.5 , (12)
P out(1) = P in(F (0)) = 0.5 , (13)
5to the system, which is the same epistemic state as before.
The observer’s knowledge is consistent and consequently
the observer would describe the situation as nonparadox-
ical even though there is no valid ontic state assignment
for the bit. The self-consistency only occurs because the
observer is implicitly treating an epistemic state as an on-
tic state when assessing the consistency of the epistemic
state. That is, applying consistency conditions to epis-
temic states hides paradoxes from the observer, rather
than resolving them. In this particular case, an observer
having a consistent description of the system does not
guarantee that there is a consistent ontic state that the
system can be in.
In this example, the classical ontology makes it easy to
see that requiring the epistemic states before and after
the interaction to be the same is an inappropriate con-
sistency condition; instead, a consistent ontic state as-
signment should be required. In the quantum case, there
is an ambiguity due to the lack of a clear, unambigu-
ous ontology of the theory. However, by analogy to the
classical case, if all quantum states are epistemic states
and there is some as yet unknown underlying ontology,
then the kinematical consistency condition will not be
appropriate.
IV. EPISTEMIC STATES AND CLOSED
TIMELIKE CURVES
We have shown that imposing certain consistency con-
ditions on epistemic states (implicitly treating them as
ontic states) can conceal paradoxes by allowing consistent
epistemic state assignments to situations for which there
is no consistent ontic state assignment. We take the per-
spective that all quantum states, both pure and mixed,
are epistemic. Consequently, we view the kinematical
consistency condition as inappropriate. We would there-
fore like to consider how an epistemic theory of quantum
states would function in the presence of CTCs. Before
we examine this, we review the properties of an epistemic
theory.
A. Epistemic interpretations of quantum mechanics
There are two main approaches to viewing quantum
states as epistemic, which differ primarily in their in-
terpretation of what the knowledge represented by a
quantum state pertains to. One is the so-called radical
Bayesian approach [18], in which quantum states catalog
the personal betting odds that a rational agent assigns
to the outcomes of future measurements. Within this ap-
proach, there is no reference to an underlying ontology,
and the only clear consistency conditions would be to en-
force Dutch-book consistency (i.e., consistency of betting
odds). We do not pursue this approach further (in part
due to the problems of assigning betting odds with time-
traveling parties), but note that it has been argued [19]
that Deutsch’s nonlinear evolution is inconsistent by this
criterion.
The second approach to an epistemic perspective of
quantum states is to consider them as describing an ob-
server’s knowledge about some underlying ontology (of-
ten called “hidden variables”). That is, quantum states
correspond to an observer’s knowledge about an objec-
tive state of the universe. Any such ontological model
that reproduces the predictions of quantum mechanics
is necessarily non-local. In addition, one could demand
(as we do) that the wavefunction in an epistemic theory
must correspond only to an observer’s knowledge and
not to any reality. Such an epistemic theory is said to be
Ψ-epistemic [20]. (In contrast, Bohm-deBroglie theory
provides a non-local ontological model that reproduces
quantum mechanics, but it is a Ψ-ontic theory wherein
the wavefunction takes the form of a physical potential,
and so is not fully compatible with the epistemic per-
spective that we advocate.)
Without a satisfactory ontological model for a Ψ-
epistemic interpretation of quantum mechanics, it is dif-
ficult to determine consistency conditions that are ap-
propriate in the presence of CTCs. To gain some un-
derstanding of this issue, we consider how Spekkens’
toy epistemic theory [21] functions in the presence of
CTCs. While the toy theory is a deliberately incom-
plete model of quantum mechanics, it reproduces many
so-called ‘quantum’ phenomena, such as incomplete in-
formation from any measurement, the necessity of distur-
bance of the system associated with measurement, mu-
tually unbiased bases, remote steering, no-cloning theo-
rems, quantum teleportation and superdense coding. In
addition, it has a clearly defined ontology. The toy the-
ory therefore provides a reasonable starting point to look
at how quantum states, considered purely as states of
knowledge, would behave in the presence of CTCs. We
now briefly review some properties of the toy theory; for
full details, see [21].
B. Epistemic and ontic states within a toy theory
Proponents of an epistemic perspective of quantum
mechanics view quantum states as describing an ob-
server’s knowledge. The fundamental question that an
epistemic interpretation must answer is, what does an
observer have knowledge about?
In Spekkens’ toy theory [21], the answer to this ques-
tion is that it is knowledge about a hidden classical
ontology and there is a fundamental constraint on the
amount of knowledge the observer may possess. The
constraint on the observer’s knowledge is the knowledge-
balance principle, which states that an observer can never
have more than half of the information required to com-
pletely specify the current ontic state of the system. That
is, an observer’s knowledge about the ontic state of a sys-
tem is restricted. For the purposes of developing a simple
model, an observer’s knowledge about a system is defined
6to be the number of ‘yes-no’ questions they can answer
about the ontic state of the system from a canonical set
of questions, where a canonical set of questions contains
only the smallest number of questions needed to specify
an arbitrary ontic state. The epistemic state that an ob-
server assigns to a system is the set of ontic states of the
system that are consistent with their knowledge.
This formulation of knowledge as answers to binary
questions produces epistemic states that are analogous
to qubits. To illustrate the definitions of ‘knowledge’,
‘epistemic states’ and ‘canonical sets of questions’, con-
sider a set of 4 ontic states,
{1, 2, 3, 4} . (14)
One (of the many possible) canonical set of yes-no ques-
tions is ‘is the system in one of the ontic states 1 or 2
(denoted by 1 ∨ 2) or not?’ and ‘is the system in one of
the ontic states 1 ∨ 4 or not?’ The corresponding epis-
temic states are 1∨2 and 3∨4 (depending on the answer
to the first question), and 1 ∨ 4 and 2 ∨ 3 (depending on
the answer to the second question). For the knowledge
balance principle to be obeyed for the above set of ontic
states, an arbitrary observer can answer at most one of
the two questions needed to completely specify the ontic
state. In the above example, an observer who can answer
at most one of the given questions can describe the ontic
state as 1 ∨ 2, 1 ∨ 4, 3 ∨ 4, 2 ∨ 3 or 1 ∨ 2 ∨ 3 ∨ 4. Note
that the question ‘is the system in the ontic state 1 or
not?’ is not a canonical question, as it does not provide
a maximally efficient means of partitioning the space of
ontic states.
The set {1, 2, 3, 4} is the smallest set of ontic states
that allow observers to possess some knowledge (that is,
for an observer to answer at least one question about the
ontic state of the system) while not violating the knowl-
edge balance principle. In addition, epistemic states oc-
cur in orthogonal pairs, so this set is identified as a toybit
(analogous to a qubit). The three ways that an observer
can partition the ontic space of a toybit by asking one
question (i.e., performing a ‘measurement’) are shown in
Fig. 4. The ontic support of an epistemic state is the set
of all ontic states consistent with that epistemic state.
For example, the ontic support of the epistemic state
1 ∨ 2 is the set {1, 2}. Two epistemic states are orthog-
onal in the toy theory if the intersection of their ontic
supports is the empty set, while two epistemic states are
compatible (i.e. there are physical situations that can
be consistently described by both epistemic states) if the
intersection of the ontic supports is non-empty. For ex-
ample, the epistemic states 1∨2 and 3∨4 are orthogonal
while the epistemic states 1∨ 2 and 1∨ 4 are compatible.
If ‘measurements’ do not disturb the ontic state of the
system, then an observer could violate the knowledge
balance principle. In the above example, performing a
measurement that reports if the toybit is in one of the
ontic states 1 ∨ 2 or not, and then performing a second
measurement to determine whether the toybit is in one
of the ontic states 1 ∨ 3 or not would imply that the on-
FIG. 4. Partitioning of the ontic space corresponding to mea-
surements that distinguish between the epistemic states anal-
ogous to the quantum states: a) |0〉 and |1〉, b) |+〉 and |−〉
and c) |i〉 and |−i〉, where I denotes an ontic state that is in
the ontic support of the first epistemic state in the pair and
II represents one in the ontic support of the second.
FIG. 5. Representations of transformations on a single toybit
corresponding to the following elements of S4 in standard cy-
cle notation: a) (12)(34), b) (13)(24) and c) (14)(23). These
transformations are analogous to the qubit transformations
σz, σx and σy respectively, since if an observer applies the
transformation (a) to a system which they describe by one
of the epistemic states in Fig. 4 (a), the epistemic state will
still be a valid description. Representations of two system in-
teractions in the toy theory, analogous to the: d) SWAP and
e) C-NOT gates in quantum mechanics. The transformation
in (e), together with single system transformations, generates
the group of valid two system interactions in the toy theory.
tic state of the system would be completely known (e.g.,
if both outcomes are ‘yes’, then the ontic state must be
1). To maintain the knowledge-balance principle, a mea-
surement update rule is introduced, so that when a mea-
surement is performed upon a system and the system is
observed to be in the epistemic state with ontic support
{n1, n2, ..., nj}, then the ontic state of the system is ran-
domly disturbed to a post-measurement ontic state sam-
pled uniformly from this support {n1, n2, ..., nj}. There-
fore ‘measurements’ in the theory are statistical in a sim-
ilar manner to measurements in quantum mechanics.
The last feature of the toy theory needed to study
CTCs are valid transformations. A valid, reversible
transformation of a system within the toy theory is a
permutation of ontic states; such a transformation in-
duces a permutation of epistemic states. For example,
(12)(34) denotes the permutation that acts on a single
toybit, swapping ontic states 1 and 2 and simultaneously
swapping the ontic states 3 and 4; (1234) denotes a 4-
cycle. For a single toybit, the set of valid transformations
is S4, the group of permutations of four objects. Some
transformations on a toybit, together with all transfor-
mations on two toybits that are used in this work are
shown diagrammatically in Fig. 5.
7C. Consistency conditions on toybits traversing
closed timelike curves
We now consider how toybits behave in the presence of
CTCs, because with a clear ontology it is straightforward
to apply consistency conditions on the ontic states. We
begin by presenting our ontic consistency condition in
the toy theory and demonstrating that paradoxes can
occur. We also demonstrate that CTCs introduce initial
and final boundary conditions in the toy theory.
The natural consistency condition is that the ontic
state of the chronology-violating toybit is identified at the
points “out” and “in”. For the toy theory, this equates
to
cout = cin , (15)
where cout (cin) is the ontic state of the chronology-
violating toybit depicted in Fig. 6 (a) after (before) the
interaction.
Applying this condition to the circuit in Fig. 6 (a),
where the transformation T1 maps ontic states accord-
ing to the permutation (1234), one can immediately see
that there are no ontic states that satisfy Eq. (15) and so
this transformation would lead to a time travel paradox.
We note that any transformation that does not possess
a fixed point must necessarily be paradoxical. The ex-
istence of paradoxes here is analogous to the classical
situation, in which paradoxes can also occur, and can be
understood as arising from the underlying classical on-
tology in this theory. It is, however, in direct contrast to
the result obtained in the quantum case using the kine-
matical consistency condition proposed by Deutsch, for
which no paradoxes could occur.
Now consider the transformation (123)(4). In this case,
there is a fixed point of the transformation, namely the
ontic state 4, so this transformation does not give rise to
a paradox. However, the ontic state 4 is the only fixed
point of the transformation. Therefore an observer could
say that the chronology-violating system is definitely in
the ontic state 4, violating the knowledge balance prin-
ciple. All of the quantum mechanical phenomena that
are reproduced in the toy theory are reproduced because
of the restriction on an observer’s knowledge. Therefore,
the reproduction of generic quantum behavior may break
down when toybits traverse a CTC. This is reminiscent
of the breakdown of some of the rules of quantum me-
chanics (e.g. linear evolution of states, global unitarity)
that occur when using Deutsch’s consistency condition.
In principle this may not be an issue provided that vio-
lations of the knowledge balance principle can only occur
sufficiently close to a CTC (i.e. if there is a closed hori-
zon outside of which violations of the knowledge balance
principle cannot occur), because from an epistemic per-
spective there is no a priori reason to require that the
evolution of particles along CTCs is the same as the evo-
lution of chronology-respecting particles. However, if an
observer can use a CTC to violate the knowledge balance
FIG. 6. a) Circuit of a toybit on a CTC being acted upon
by a transformation T1. b) Circuit of a chronology-respecting
toybit that has a measurement M performed on it and then
interacts with a chronology-violating toybit. c) Circuit of a
chronology-respecting toybit being prepared in a correlated
epistemic state with another chronology-respecting toybit a
via a state preparation procedure P and then interacting with
a system on a CTC through the interaction T2. The letters
on the worldlines denote the ontic state of the corresponding
system, with the superscript indicating whether the system is
in the input or output state.
principle for chronology-respecting toybits, then the be-
havior of the toy theory would be qualitatively different
depending on whether or not observers have access to
CTCs.
To examine the knowledge balance principle for
chronology-respecting toybits in the presence of CTCs,
we consider a chronology-respecting toybit interacting
with a chronology-violating toybit as shown in Fig. 6 (b).
Due to the difficulty in characterizing transformations
of three or more toybits, we will only consider a sin-
gle chronology-respecting toybit interacting with a single
chronology-violating toybit.
If the transformation T2 in Fig. 6 (b) is a product of
local transformations, then the interaction may or may
not be paradoxical (depending on whether the transfor-
mation of the chronology-violating toybit has fixed points
or not), but it will not lead to a violation of the knowl-
edge balance principle. The group of two toybit trans-
formations is generated by local transformations and the
correlating transformation TCN in Fig. 5 (e), which is
analogous to a CNOT gate. Composing TCN with lo-
cal transformations will not change whether or not the
knowledge balance principle is violated, so we need only
consider the case T2 = TCN .
For this case, there are ontic states of the joint system
8that satisfy Eq. (15), namely, whenever the ontic state of
the chronology-respecting toybit is 1 or 3 (where we have
taken the chronology-respecting system to be system
A). If, however, the observer measures the chronology-
respecting toybit before the interaction and finds, for ex-
ample, that it is in one of the states 1 ∨ 2, then the only
ontic state of the chronology-respecting toybit that al-
lows for a consistent solution of Eq. (15) is the state 1.
The observer has therefore obtained complete knowledge
of the chronology-respecting toybit that is correct from
the time the measurement is made until the transforma-
tion is applied. After the transformation is applied, the
chronology-respecting system can be in either of the on-
tic states 1 (if the ontic state of the chronology-violating
toybit is 1 or 2) or 3 (if the ontic state of the chronology-
violating toybit is 3 or 4), and so the knowledge balance
principle is obeyed after the interaction.
This process may appear to violate the knowledge bal-
ance principle in the intermediate time between the mea-
surement and the transformation. However, even though
the observer can completely specify the ontic state of the
system at a given time, this does not constitute a viola-
tion of the knowledge balance principle as the observer’s
knowledge is contingent upon a future interaction.
Similar behavior can occur without involving CTCs in
scenarios involving pre- and post-selection. For exam-
ple, consider a toybit prepared in an initial (epistemic)
state 1 ∨ 2. An observer can define conditional post-
selection probabilities p(o|M = m,E) that the current
ontic state is o given that the outcome m will be ob-
served in a future measurementM on a system prepared
in the epistemic state E. If the future measurement is
1 ∨ 3 versus 2 ∨ 4, then, contingent on the future out-
come being 1 ∨ 3, the observer knows, with “certainty”
that the current ontic state is 1 (equivalently, if they per-
form the measurement and observe the outcome, they
can retrodict with certainty the ontic state of the toybit
before the measurement is performed). However, as dis-
cussed in Ref. [21, 22], this is not a contradiction of the
knowledge balance principle, correctly formulated, as the
knowledge balance principle only applies to an observer’s
present knowledge and the observer does not know which
outcome will occur. In this example, the observer’s epis-
temic state, contingent upon the measurement being per-
formed but without post-selecting on the outcome is still
1 ∨ 2 as the probability that they assign to the system
being in the ontic state o is
p(o|E) =
∑
m
p(o|M = m,E)p(M = m|E) , (16)
where p(M = m|E) is the probability that the observer
assigns to the outcome m of the measurement M when
performed on a system prepared in the epistemic state E.
This scenario is directly analogous to the ‘violation’ of the
uncertainty principle in pre- and post-selection scenarios
in quantum mechanics [22].
The scenario in Fig. 6 (b) is equivalent to post-selecting
on an ontic state that allows for nonparadoxical evolu-
tion for the specified transformation. However, if in-
stead of TCN , the interaction was the transformation
T ′2, obtained by composing the permutation (12) acting
on the chronology-respecting toybit with TCN , then the
ontic state of the chronology-respecting system between
the time of measurement and the interaction with the
chronology-violating toybit must be 2. If the observer
cannot, even in principle, know which of the two inter-
actions described above will occur, then from the time
of measurement to the interaction, the correct epistemic
state they should assign is 1 ∨ 2, as they should set the
probability p(o) of the system being in the ontic state o
to
p(o) = p(T2)p(o|T2) + p(T
′
2)p(o|T
′
2) , (17)
where p(T ′2) = p(T
′
2) = 1/2 and p(o|T ) is the probability
of the ontic state being o conditioned upon the future in-
teraction being T . Therefore the knowledge-balance prin-
ciple can be maintained for chronology-respecting sys-
tems by restricting an observer’s knowledge about how
chronology-violating systems interact with chronology-
respecting systems.
Note that even if the observer does not know
how a chronology-violating system will interact with a
chronology-respecting toybit, the interaction still places
a final boundary condition on toybits. If the interaction
could somehow be changed (e.g., if the permutation (12)
can be applied to the chronology-respecting toybit), then
this has a retrocausal effect, in that the ontic state of the
system between the measurement and the transformation
(12) must be changed to avoid a paradox.
In addition to placing final boundary conditions on
toybits, CTCs can also introduce initial boundary con-
ditions of toybits that interact with chronology-violating
particles. For example, if the chronology-respecting and
chronology-violating particles represented by Fig. 6 (b)
interact via the transformation in Fig. 5 (e), then the
only way Eq. (15) can be satisfied is if the chronology-
respecting system is initially in either the ontic state 1 or
the ontic state 3. This behavior matches the predictions
of classical physics, where initial and/or final boundary
conditions are often required to avoid paradoxes.
D. Consistency conditions for epistemic states
We have shown that the ontic states of the toy theory
in the presence of CTCs can be paradoxical, just like the
classical case and unlike the quantum behavior that fol-
lows from Deutsch’s kinematical consistency condition.
However, as we will show, the epistemic states of the toy
theory in these scenarios can serve to conceal the para-
doxes in the underlying ontological model. This provides
us with a new perspective on Deutsch’s result.
In the toy theory, an observer’s epistemic state is a
probability distribution over the ontic states that is uni-
form and non-zero for the ontic states that are consistent
with the observer’s knowledge and zero for those ontic
9states that are inconsistent with the observer’s knowl-
edge. In the presence of CTCs, an observer’s additional
knowledge about the dynamics of a system on a CTC
only allows them to say what ontic states are consistent.
Of the states that are consistent, the observer has no
reason to prefer one state over another (since there is no
preferred state in the toy theory), and so should assign
equal probabilities to the ontic states that are consistent
with the interaction and zero to the states that are not
consistent with the interaction.
Consider the scenario depicted in Fig. 6 (a) (analogous
to the one in Sec. III A), in which a toybit on a CTC has
the transformation (13)(24) applied to it. There is no on-
tic state that the toybit can consistently be in and so the
situation should be seen as paradoxical. However, there
are three epistemic states (1 ∨ 3, 2 ∨ 4 and 1 ∨ 2 ∨ 3 ∨ 4)
that are invariant under the transformation (13)(24), and
so if an observer enforced a consistency condition upon
their knowledge, there would be a consistent solution to
the evolution of epistemic states, even though there is
no consistent ontic state assignment. That is, applying
a direct analog of Deutsch’s consistency condition to the
epistemic states would conceal, rather than resolve, para-
doxical ontic state assignments.
Moreover, consider the zero knowledge epistemic state,
1∨ 2∨ 3∨ 4. This epistemic state is invariant under any
valid transformation on a single toybit, since all trans-
formations in the toy theory are permutations of ontic
states. Therefore it would satisfy an analog of Deutsch’s
consistency condition for any transformation acting on
a single chronology-violating toybit. However, this epis-
temic state does not resolve any paradoxes for the ontic
states. Rather, it corresponds to an observer knowing
nothing and consequently not knowing that anything is
wrong.
From an epistemic interpretation, then, Deutsch’s
proof that there is always a consistent, but not necessar-
ily pure, density state assignment to qubits on CTCs is
no surprise. With an epistemic perspective it often corre-
sponds to an observer not having enough information to
discern that there is in fact a paradox. For our example
of a CNOT coupling, if one applied a condition analogous
to Deutsch’s maximum entropy condition, namely, that
observers should assign the state of minimum knowledge
(equivalent to maximum entropy from an epistemic per-
spective) that is self-consistent, then observers will never
be able to say anything about the dynamical behavior of
toybits traversing CTCs, as the zero-knowledge state is
always consistent. If there is some underlying ontology
in quantum mechanics, then such concealment of para-
doxes may occur under the consistency conditions that
have been considered.
E. Correlations between chronology-respecting and
violating systems
One of the issues that arises when quantum mechanics
is applied to particles traversing CTCs is the possibility
of time-displaced entanglement. Under an ontic inter-
pretation of any quantum states (either wavefunctions
or density matrices), time-displaced entanglement would
allow a measurement on a chronology-respecting system
to change the state of a qubit on a CTC that is in the
causal history of the chronology-respecting system. As
shown in Sec. III, Deutsch’s consistency condition not
only excludes the possibility of entanglement between the
CTC qubit and chronology-respecting qubits by using the
partial trace, i.e., by physically changing the ontic state
of the system, but also acts to reduce entanglement be-
tween chronology-respecting systems that interact with
chronology-violating systems.
We now explore how an analogous situation is handled
in the toy theory, which is defined as a strictly local the-
ory. One advantage of an epistemic perspective is that
time-displaced entanglement can be viewed as a form of
(noncausal and nonclassical) correlation. In the strictly
local toy theory, when an observer measures one half of
a pair of systems that they describe by some correlated
epistemic state, then the outcome of the measurement
allows them to update the epistemic state by which they
describe the other system, without any physical change
occurring in the other system. These correlations are suf-
ficient to allow for ‘quantum’ teleportation, superdense
coding and remote steering, and so they seem to cap-
ture at least some of the quantum correlations. While,
from an epistemic perspective, other correlations (espe-
cially those required to violate a Bell inequality) must
be due to a nonlocal ontology, examining how the local
correlations behave in the presence of CTCs will reveal
something of how correlations between epistemic quan-
tum states may behave.
Consider the circuit shown in Fig. 6 (c), where the
transformation is analogous to a swap gate, which acts
on ontic states as shown in Fig. 5 (d). Systems A and
B are chronology-respecting toybits (in the ontic states
a and b respectively), described by some observer by the
maximally correlated epistemic state 1.1 v 2.2 v 3.3 v 4.4
before the interaction. System C (in the ontic state c) is
a chronology-violating toybit that interacts with toybit B
via the swap gate. Since toybits B and C interact via the
swap gate, the only consistent ontic solution is that toybit
C must always be in the same ontic state that toybit B
was in before the interaction and the state of toybits A
and B are not changed by the interaction. Therefore,
after the interaction, toybits A and B can be described
by the same maximally correlated epistemic state. That
is, the CTC does not decorrelate the systems.
While from this example everything looks sensible from
an epistemic perspective, it is important to remember
that the toy theory is a strictly local theory and it is
unclear how any nonlocal variables (responsible for cor-
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relations that allow violations of Bell inequalities) would
behave in the presence of CTCs. The swap gate in the toy
theory acts only on the ontic state of toybit B, whereas in
an epistemic interpretation of quantum theory, the swap
gate would act on a nonlocal ontological state.
V. CONCLUSION
The consistency conditions appropriate to many inter-
pretations of quantum mechanics will lead to paradox-
ical situations, just as in classical physics. Deutsch ar-
gues for a particular interpretation, with mixed states
being ontic, in order to avoid such paradoxes. If, how-
ever, mixed quantum states are indeed epistemic, then
Deutsch’s treatment may simply be concealing paradoxes
because there is always a consistent epistemic state as-
signment (e.g., a zero knowledge state) to scenarios where
there is no truly consistent ontic state assignment.
More specifically, if a mixed density matrix is taken to
represent an observer’s knowledge, then Deutsch’s con-
sistency condition (or any other consistency condition
imposed upon the density matrix) will be inappropri-
ate. This suggests that many of the results that have
been derived from Deutsch’s consistency condition may
be due to an incorrect consistency condition rather than
genuine physical behavior near CTCs. This is a general
consequence of attempting to apply the quantum formal-
ism to scenarios arising in general relativity, which can
be a challenge without a clearly defined ontology.
In order to illustrate possible effects of CTCs from an
epistemic perspective with a clearly defined ontology, we
examined CTCs in the context of Spekkens’ incomplete
toy theory, which is based upon the principle that there
is a fundamental restriction on knowledge. This princi-
ple allows for many quantum mechanical phenomena to
occur in a classical ontology. In accordance with classi-
cal physics and in contrast to results based on Deutsch’s
consistency condition, we find that introducing CTCs
into the toy theory and allowing arbitrary interactions
between chronology-respecting and chronology-violating
systems places both initial and final boundary conditions
on the ontic state of systems that interact with CTCs and
also leads to time travel paradoxes.
The toy theory also provides a physically reasonable
way of treating correlations between systems such that
not all information is lost when one half of an entangled
pair interacts with a chronology-violating system (which
is what happens when Deutsch’s consistency condition is
applied).
Introducing CTCs into the toy theory for two toy-
bits can be done without violating the knowledge bal-
ance principle by enforcing an additional constraint on
observers’ knowledge, namely, that they cannot know
in advance how chronology-violating and chronology-
respecting systems will interact. However, this highlights
an apparent retrocausality in the toy theory, in that if the
interaction is not fixed in advance, then the ontic state
of a chronology-respecting system may be altered by the
choice of interaction in order to avoid a paradox. It is
currently unclear whether or not the knowledge balance
principle can be violated in the presence of CTCs for
larger numbers of toybits.
In our opinion, the issues surrounding time travel have
not been satisfactorily resolved. Rather, there is much
work to be done to determine whether or not CTCs result
in physically unreasonable behavior, but this work must
be done in the context of a clearly defined ontology, which
will in turn depend upon the interpretation of quantum
mechanics that is employed.
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